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Introduction: The new political economy of violence in Latin America 
Violence has long been recognised as a major social concern. War in particular, whether 
between states or within states, is widely considered “one of the main causes of human 
suffering and economic underdevelopment”. 2 But while war is perhaps the most paradigmatic 
manifestation of violence, it is by no means the only one, and certainly not the only one to 
have critical social implications. Criminal violence, for example, has been increasingly 
recognised as a major social problem. 3 Worldwide, crime rates have risen by an average of 50 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Sue Redgrave for suggesting the first part of the title of this paper. I also want to thank Jo 
Beall, James Fairheard, Ralph Grillo, Ann Mason, Maxine Molyneux, Viviana Patroni, James Putzel, Rachel 
Sieder, and María Emma Wills for useful comments made in response to oral presentations of early versions of 
this paper at York University (Canada), the Universidad de los Andes (Colombia), the University of Sussex, and 
the Institute of Latin American Studies (United Kingdom). I would also like to acknowledge Arturo Matute’s 
able transcription of my February-March 2002 fieldwork interviews. 
2 F. Stewart & V. FitzGerald, ‘Introduction: Assessing the Economic Costs of War’, in F. Stewart, V. FitzGerald 
and associates, War and Underdevelopment: Volume 1 – The Economic and Social Consequences of Conflict, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001a, p.1. See also F. Stewart, V. FitzGerald and associates, War and 
Underdevelopment: Volume 2 – Country Experiences, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001b, although it 
should be noted that the relationship between violence and underdevelopment is extremely complex and many 
commentators have in fact reversed the link, arguing that it is processes of both underdevelopment and 
development which give rise to violence – See e.g. P. Collier, ‘Doing Well out of War’, in M. Berdal and D. 
Malone, (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000; M. 
Duffield, ‘The Political Economy of Internal War: Asset Transfer, Complex Emergencies and International 
Aid’, in J. Macrae and A. Zwi (eds), War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex 
Emergencies, London: Zed Books, 1994; D. Keen, ‘The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars’, 
Adelphi Papers, no. 303, Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
1996; G. Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, 3 volumes, New York, NY: Twentieth 
Century Fund, 1968; and P. Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, New York & 
Oxford: Kumarian Press, 1998. 
3 See, for example: R. L. Ayres, Crime and Violence as Development Issues in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Latin American and Caribbean Studies Viewpoint Studies Series, Washington, DC: The World 
Bank, 1998; T. P. R. Caldeira, ‘Crime and Individual Rights: Reframing the Question of Violence in Latin 
America’, in E. Jelin and E. Hershberg, (eds), Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship, and Society 
in Latin America, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996; T. P. R. Caldeira, City of Walls: Crime, Segregation, 
and Citizenship in São Paulo, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001; P. Fajnzylber, D. Lederman & N. 
Loayza, Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World: An Empirical Assessment, Latin 
American and Caribbean Studies Viewpoint Studies Series, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1998; C. 
McIllwaine, ‘Geography and development: Crime and violence as development issues’, Progress in Human 
Geography, 23:3 (1999), pp 453-463; C. Moser & J. Holland, Urban Poverty and Violence in Jamaica, Latin 
American and Caribbean Studies Viewpoint Studies Series, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1997; C. Moser 
& E. Shrader, ‘A Conceptual Framework for Violence Reduction’, Latin America and Caribbean Region 
Sustainable Development Working Paper no. 3, Urban Peace Program Series, Washington, DC: The World 
Bank, 1999; R. Patel, ‘Urban violence: An overview’, in J. Beall, (ed), A City for All: Valuing Difference and 
Working with Diversity, London:  Zed, 1997;  D. Rodgers, ‘Youth Gangs and Violence in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: A Literature Survey’, Latin America and Caribbean Region Sustainable Development Working 
Paper no. 4, Urban Peace Program Series, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1999; D. Rodgers, , ‘Youth 
Gangs in Colombia and Nicaragua: New Forms of Violence, New Theoretical Directions?’, in A. Rudqvist (ed), 
Breeding Inequality – Reaping Violence: Exploring Linkages and Causality in Colombia and Beyond (Utsikt 
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percent over the past 25 years, with a notable surge during the past decade.4 The phenomenon 
has affected the entire developing world, but has been particularly marked in Latin America, 
where the most visible forms of violence now no longer stem from ideological conflicts over 
the nature of the political system, as in the past, but from delinquency and crime.5 At the 
same time, incidences of violence in Latin America have now reached unprecedented levels,6 
despite much of the region undergoing processes of demilitarisation and democratisation 
during the past decade and a half.7 
As Jenny Pearce has remarked, while “the idea that the region’s conflicts have been 
‘resolved’ may be true at the formal level of peace accords between armies and insurgents, 
[it] is less so at the real level of people’s everyday lives, which remain overshadowed in the 
1990s by ...violence, today of a more social and multifaceted kind than the polarized and 
political violence characteristic of the 1980s”.8 This is perhaps most apparent in 
contemporary Central America, where criminal violence is now so prevalent that levels of 
violence are comparable or even higher than during the decade of war which affected the 
region during the 1980s.9 In El Salvador, for example, the average number of violent deaths 
per year due to crime throughout the mid-1990s exceeded the average tally due to war during 
the 1980s by over 40 percent,10 while in Guatemala the economic costs of crime were 
calculated to be US$565 million in 1999,11 compared to an estimated US$575 million loss to 
the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a result of war between 1981-85.12 
Although it is important not to underestimate the continuities between the past and the 
present – crime is not a new phenomenon in Latin America, political violence is by no means 
extinct, and the boundaries between the two phenomena not always clear-cut – violence in 
contemporary Latin America can be said to have become more diffuse and disordered in 
nature. There has arguably occurred what Dirk Kruijt and Kees Koonings term a 
“democratisation” of violence in the region, whereby it has “ceased to be the resource of only 
                                                                                                                                                        
mot utveckling/Outlook on development series no. 18), Uppsala: Collegium for Development Studies, 2003; and 
UNRISD, States of Disarray: The Social Effects of Globalization, Geneva: UNRISD, 1995. 
4 Fajnzylber et al. (1998), p.11. 
5 See Caldeira (1996), p.199. See also C. T. Call, Sustainable Development in Central America: The Challenges 
of Violence, Injustice and Insecurity, CA 2020 working paper no. 8, Hamburg: Institut für Iberoamerika -Kunde, 
2000; C. Moser & A. Winton, ‘Violence in the Central American Region: Towards an Integrated Frame work for 
Violence Reduction’, Overseas Development Institute Working Paper No. 171, London: ODI, 2002; and J. 
Pearce, ‘From civil war to “civil society”: Has the end of the Cold War brought peace to Central America?’, 
International Affairs, 74:3 (1998), pp.587-615. 
6 See OPS (Organización Panamericana de la Salud - Pan-American Health Organization), La Violencia en las 
Américas: La Pandemia Social del Siglo XX, Washington, DC: OPS, 1996; and J. L. Londoño, A. Gaviria & R. 
Guerrero (eds), Asalto al Desarrollo: Violencia en América Latina, Washington, DC: Inter-American 
Development Bank, 2000. 
7 See J. G. Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left after the Cold War, New York: Vintage, 1993; 
O. Dabène, La Région Amérique Latine: Interdépendance et Changement Politique, Paris: Presses de Sciences 
Po, 1997; and S. Halebsky & R. L. Harris, ‘Introduction: Capital, Power, and Inequality in Latin America’, in S. 
Halebsky and R. L. Harris (eds), Capital, Power, and Inequality in Latin America, Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1995. 
8 Pearce (1998), p.589. 
9 See Call (2000), pp.7-14; Moser & Winton (2002), pp.5-8; and Pearce (1998), pp.589-590. 
10 Calculated on the basis of Pearce (1998), p.590. 
11 Moser & Winton (2002), p.33. 
12 This last figure expressed in constant 1995 US$, calculated on the basis of R. Ahrend, The Economic 
Consequences of Fighting and Ending Latin America’s Civil Wars: What to Expect from Peace in Colombia?, 
paper presented to the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association conference (LACEA ‘99), 
Santiago de Chile, 21-23 October 1999; and the World Bank Development Indicators 
(http://www.worldbank.org/data/onlinedbs/onlinedbases.htm, accessed 2 September 2002). 
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the traditionally powerful or of the grim uniformed guardians of the nation... [but] 
increasingly appears as an option for a multitude of actors in pursuit of all kinds of goals”.13 
Understanding the dynamics and ramifications of this new regime of disorganized brutality, 
and in particular how such forms of violence can become defining features of social life, how 
they can both contribute to and undermine groups and communities, and how they can evolve 
and change, is obviously of crucial importance to understanding the reality of contemporary 
Latin America.  
This is a task probably best approached by focusing on a particular actor within this new 
political economy of violence, perhaps the most prominent of which are youth gangs. These 
are a widespread throughout Latin America,14 and while it is difficult to quantify the 
proportion of regional violence directly attributable to them, there is no doubt that they 
account for a significant share. Certainly, most criminal acts in Latin America involve youth, 
and in particular young males, who make up the overwhelming majority of gang 
membership.15 In 1996, for example, 29 percent of all reported homicides in the region were 
committed by youths aged between 10 and 19 years old, and a further 34 percent by youths 
aged 20 to 29 years old.16 As such, youth gangs potentially constitute an ideal lens through 
which to explore the dynamics and ramifications of the new political economy of violence in 
Latin America, and this paper consequently presents an ethnographic case study of an urban 
Nicaraguan youth gang. My data derives from participant observation research conducted in 
1996-97 and 2002 in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, 17 a low-income neighbourhood in 
Managua, Nicaragua.18 The first part of this paper provides a brief overview of crime and 
violence in contemporary urban Nicaragua, exploring some of its socio-economic 
consequences and situating gang violence within it. The second part offers an account of the 
barrio Luis Fanor Hernández youth gang as it existed in 1996-97, followed by a description 
of the gang in 2002, focusing on violent gang practices. The third section considers the nature 
of these two manifestations of the gang and the general evolution of the gang between 1997 
and 2002 from an institutional point of view. 
 
                                                 
13 D. Kru ijt & K. Koonings, ‘Introduction: Violence and Fear in Latin America’, in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt 
(eds), Societies of Fear: The Legacy of Civil War, Violence and Terror in Latin America, London: Zed Books, 
1999, p.11. 
14 See Rodgers (1999). 
15 See Ayres (1998), p.4; McIllwaine (1999); as well as C. Moser & B. van Bronkhorst, ‘Youth Violence in 
Latin America and the Caribbean: Costs, Causes, and Interventions’, Latin America and the Caribbean Region 
Sustainable Development working paper no. 2, Urban Peace Program series, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 
1999. 
16 See R. Guerrero, ‘Epidemia de la violencia juvenil en América’, Espacios: Revista Centroamericana de 
Cultura Política, 10 (July -December 1997). 
17 A pseudonym, as are all the names mentioned in this paper. 
18 The first period of fieldwork, in July 1996-July 1997, was carried out in the context of a social anthropology 
PhD at the University of Cambridge (D. Rodgers, Living in the Shadow of Death: Violence, Pandillas, and 
Social Disintegration in Contemporary Urban Nicaragua, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Social 
Anthropology, University of Cambridge, 2000), partly funded by grants from the Royal Anthropological 
Institute of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Trinity College William Wyse Foundation. The second, 
in February-March 2002, was conducted as part of the London School of Economics and Political Science 
Development Research Centre’s Crisis States Programme (see http://www.crisisstates.com/), which also 
sponsored a further visit in December 2002-January 2003. 
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Violence, crime, and pandillas in contemporary urban Nicaragua 
Violence is not a new feature in Nicaragua. The country has the dubious distinction of having 
been ruled by the longest-running dictatorship in Latin American history, that of the Somoza 
dynasty, which after 45 years was overthrown in 1979 by the left-wing Sandinista revolution. 
The triumph of the revolution led to an attritional civil war against the US-supported Contras, 
which was marked by numerous instances of brutality, albeit mainly confined to the country’s 
rural areas.19 This war only truly came to an end in 1990 following the electoral defeat of the 
Sandinista regime, and since then, Nicaragua has generally been considered to be at peace. 
However, although the country’s conflicts have formally come to an ‘end’, violence remains 
an overwhelming reality, to the extent that, as Eduardo Galeano has pithily remarked, while 
peace paradoxically reigned in the streets of the country’s cities during the years of war, 
“since peace was declared the streets have become scenes of war, the battlegrounds of 
common criminals and youth gangs”. 20 
Crime levels have risen steadily in Nicaragua by an average of ten percent every year during 
the past decade, compared to an uneven average of just two percent during the years of war in 
the 1980s.21 In particular, the number of violent crimes leading to injury increased by 135 
percent between 1992 and 1998,22 and crime rates in general further jumped up by 44 percent 
between 1997 and 2001.23 Although the official homicide rate stood at an average of just 16 
deaths per 100,000 persons during the 1990s,24 statistical underreporting is a serious problem 
in Nicaragua, to a large extent due to the institutional weakness of health and government 
organisations. A recent report by the Pan-American Health Organisation estimated that over 
50 percent of all mortalities in Nicaragua in 1995 were not registered, for example,25 and the 
Nicaraguan National Police lacks the capacity to collect data systematically, partly due to the 
radical reforms that it has undergone since regime change in 1990, which have dramatically 
affected its operational capacities.26 During a year’s fieldwork conducted in the poor 
Managua barrio Luis Fanor Hernández in 1996-97, I tallied nine crime-related deaths in the 
                                                 
19 See R. Spalding, ‘From Low Intensity War to Low Intensity Peace: The Nicaraguan Peace Process’, in C. 
Arson (ed.), Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999. 
20  See E. Galeano, Patas Arriba: La Escuela del Mundo al Revés, 4th edition, Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1998, 
pp.322-324. For translation see, E. Galeano, Upside Down: A Primer for the Looking-Glass World, translated by 
M. Fried, New York: Picador, 2000 [1998], pp.314-316. 
21  See A. Granera Sacasa & S. J. Cuarezma Terán, Evolución del Delito en Nicaragua (1980-1995) , Managua: 
Editorial UCA, 1997; A. Serbin & D. Ferreyra, Gobernabilidad Democrática y Seguridad Ciudadana en 
Centroamérica: El caso de Nicaragua, Managua: CRIES, 2000; La Prensa , 11 July & 5 September 2001; and 
http://www.policia.gob.ni/anuario/addptos.htm (accessed 5 March 2003). 
22  See respectively La Tribuna, 2 May 1997; and E. Cuadra Lira, Proliferación y control de armas en 
Nicaragua, report prepared on behalf of the Fundación Arias para la Paz y el Progreso Humano for the 1st 
Central American Forum on the Proliferation of Light Weapons, Antigua, Guatemala, 27-29 July, 2000, p.8. 
23  See http://www.policia.gob.ni/anuario/addptos.htm (accessed 5 March 2003). 
24  Serbin & Ferreyra (2000), p.187; and PNUD (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo - United 
Nations Development Programme), El Desarrollo Humano en Nicaragua, Managua: PNUD , 2000. 
25  See PAHO (Pan-American Health Organization), Health in the Americas report on Nicaragua online, 1998, at 
http://www.paho.org/english/HIA1998/Nicaragua.pdf. 
26  The Police has been reduced both in size and budget, to the extent that it only has a limited presence in many 
urban areas, and is in fact completely absent in 21 percent of the country’s 146 municipalities (R. J. Cajina, 
‘Nicaragua: De la seguridad del Estado a la inseguridad ciudadana’, in Serbin & Ferreyra, 2000, p.174). There 
are 121 police personnel per 100,000 inhabitants in Nicaragua, compared to a regional average of 195 in Central 
America, and 285 in the USA or 266 in Spain, for example (Call, 2000, pp.24-25). Within the Central American 
region, the Nicaraguan National Police have the lowest number of police personnel per 100,000 inhabitants, the 
lowest number of police personnel per 100 crimes, the lowest budget per crime, the lowest budget per police 
personnel, and the lowest average salaries (See http://www.policia.gob.ni/diap07pm.htm, accessed 3 April 
2002). 
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neighbourhood, which works out proportionally to a staggering 360 deaths per 100,000 
persons. While such a calculation is of course unsystematic and based on a small sample, it is 
certainly suggestive that official statistics are wrong. 27 
Certainly, this was amply borne out in a qualitative way during the course of my fieldwork in 
barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, both in 1996-97 and 2002. Beyond personally experiencing 
and witnessing criminal acts, this was reflected in the practices and the discourses of 
neighbourhood inhabitants. There was a prevalent fear of leaving the perceived safe haven of 
the home in the barrio in 1996, which had worsened by 2002 as even the shelter of the home 
now seemed precarious, with houses barricaded up in an almost fort- like manner and 
occupants emerging as little as possible, and when they did so, restricting themselves to a few 
fixed routes and destinations. “We are living in a state of siege”, was how an informant called 
Adilia described the situation in 1997, and in 2002 she told me that “things are worse, people 
are scared to leave their homes, it’s too dangerous”. Her mother, Doña Yolanda, further 
echoed this sense of insecurity:  
There’s so much delinquency, it’s impossible to live… they’ll kill you for a 
watch… they’ll kill you for a pair of shoes… they’ll kill you for your shirt … 
they’re everywhere, you’ve got to watch out… they could be your neighbour, 
even your friend, you can never be sure… you can’t go out any more, you can’t 
wear rings, bracelets, nice shoes, anything that makes us look a little better than 
we really are… how can we live? It’s not possible… 
 
This chronic insecurity has had dramatic consequences for local community life, with the 
erosion of the social fabric reaching such dramatic proportions in Nicaragua that it is no 
exaggeration to talk of an atomisation of life.28 “It’s each to his own” was an expression that 
was constantly repeated by my informants when describing Nicaraguan social life in both 
1996-97 and 2002, and indeed, traditionally solidary social units such as the family, the 
household, or the neighbourhood have shattered, and networks of trust and mutual aid have 
worn away. There is little in the way of a local social collectivity, as one of my informants, 
called Don Sergio, described in 1997:  
Nobody does anything for anybody anymore, nobody cares if their neighbour is 
robbed, nobody does anything for the common good. There’s a lack of trust, you 
don’t know whether somebody will return you your favours, or whether he won’t 
steal your belongings when your back is turned. It’s the law of the jungle here; 
we’re eating one another, as they say in the Bible… 
In 2002, the situation was no better, as Doña Yolanda made clear:  
                                                 
27  At the same time, it should be noted that while Nicaragua is undoubtedly very violent, the levels of violence 
afflicting the country are of a lower order of magnitude than those affecting a number of other countries in the 
region such as Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, or parts of urban Brazil. Furthermore, it is a violence that is 
very much concentrated in poor urban areas. 
28  See Nitlapán-Envío team, ‘The crisis is bordering on the intolerable’, Envío (in English), 14:167 (June 1995), 
pp 3-13; J. C. Núñez, De la Ciudad al Barrio: Redes y Tejidos Urbanos en Guatemala, El Salvador y 
Nicaragua, Ciudad de Guatemala: Universidad Rafael Landívar/PROFASR, 1996; and Rodgers (2000, 2003). A 
variety of other factors can also be invoked to explain Nicaragua’s desperate social predicament, including the 
legacy of war, revolution, and turmoil in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as high levels of debt, structural 
adjustment, chronic poverty, corruption, political stagnation, and natural catastrophes in the 1990s. At the same 
time, while my informants frequently mentioned these, it was the question of security that came out most 
forcefully in their discourses, both in 1996-97 and 2002. 
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You never feel safe in the barrio, because of the lack of trust. There always has to 
be somebody in the house, because you can’t trust anybody to look out for you, 
for your things, to help you, nothing. People only look out for themselves – 
everyone, the rich, the poor, the middle class… Life is hard in Nicaragua, and 
you’ve just got to look out for yourself and try and survive by hook or by crook. 
It was the same five years ago; nothing has changed, except that we’re now five 
years on, and the future didn’t get any better… 
Even if they are not solely responsible for the widespread criminal violence in contemporary 
Nicaragua, the most prominent criminal actors are undoubtedly the pandillas, or youth gangs, 
that roam the streets of Nicaraguan cities, robbing, beating, terrorising, and frequently killing. 
They are a ubiquitous feature of many urban barrios and major contributors to the high levels 
of crime. Certainly, although not all are gang members, over 52 percent of all those arrested 
in Nicaragua in 1997, were between 13 and 25 years old (i.e. falling within gang membership 
age);29 while a recent survey which found that crime was considered, by a margin of over 30 
percent, the principal problem affecting Nicaragua today, also found that pandillas were 
considered the most likely perpetrators of crime.30 More generally, pandillas have to a large 
extent come to epitomize symbolically crime in the contemporary Nicaraguan collective 
consciousness, with the word “pandilla” used very much interchangeably with more general 
terms such as “criminality” or “delinquency”.  
Despite its wide-ranging import, however, the term “pandilla” denotes a definite local social 
phenomenon. At its most basic, a pandilla generally consists of a variably sized group of 
generally male youths,31 whose ages can range between 7 and 23 years old, and who engage 
in illicit and violent behaviour – although not all gang activities are either illicit or violent – 
and have a particular dynamic. Most notably, pandillas are territorial and tend to be 
associated with a particular urban neighbourhood,32 although larger neighbourhoods 
frequently have more than one gang and not all have one, for reasons which include the level 
of social fragmentation, demographic distribution, and economic factors, including the 
                                                 
29  See J. L. Rocha, ‘Pandillero: La mano que empuña el mortero’, Envío, March 2000, at 
http://www.uca.edu.ni/publicaciones/revistas/envio/2000/esp/MARZO/Pandilleros.htm. 
30  See PNUD (2000), p.130. 
31  Although female gang members are not unknown, they are not the norm, although according to newspaper 
reports and urban legend there were two all-female pandillas in Managua in 1997, one in barrio 19 de Julio, and 
the other in the Ciudad Sandino suburb. The few young women gravitating around pandillas on a regular basis 
tend to be treated as communal sex objects by male pandilleros and are not really considered “proper” members 
of the gang as such. Having said this, there was a female member in the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang in 
the early 1990s. Her femininity was very obviously downplayed whenever contemporary pandilleros would talk 
about her, however. She was invariably described as having been extremely violent and fearless, both of which 
reflected the machismo-inspired ideal of what a gang member should be, and it can be argued that there had 
been a certain “masculinization” of her status, implicitly pointing to the absence of female roles within the 
pandilla . Generally, there did not seem to be alternative collective organisational forms for fema le youth in the 
neighbourhood, although there were of course female friendship networks, but these tended to remain rather 
small in size, and were certainly not organised in any way. To a certain extent this absence of alternative female 
collective organis ational forms was linked to the fact that due to the ambient machismo , young women were 
rarely seen in the streets past a certain age (around 14 years old), due to the existence of a gendered division of 
space along the lines of “street = public = male/home = private = female” (See S. Ekern, Street Power: Culture 
and Politics in a Nicaraguan Neighbourhood, Bergen Studies in Social Anthropology No. 40, Bergen: 
University of Bergen, 1987, p.55). 
32  Pandillas are an urban phenomenon; indeed, in 1996-97 there were no more than half a dozen gangs outside 
Managua, which is more than ten times the size of Nicaragua’s second biggest urban centre. In 2002, however, 
Nicaraguan newspapers were regularly reporting on gang activity in a variety of urban centres other than 
Managua, including Chinandega, Estelí, Granada, León, and Matagalpa, although there were no reports of rural 
pandillas. 
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opportunities young neighbourhood inhabitants might have (such as migratory possibilities, 
for example). By 1999, the Nicaraguan National Police was estimating that there were some 
110 pandillas in Managua alone – which is made up of some 600 barrios and spontaneous 
settlements – incorporating about 8,500 youths,33 double the number three years previously. 
These figures probably err on the low side, although there is some evidence to suggest that 
youth gang membership peaked around 1995-96, and that the total number of youths involved 
has declined in absolute terms since then but that gang groups have simultaneously become 
smaller, such that while there are less pandilleros, there are an increasing number of 
pandillas.34 
Pandillas are not a new social phenomenon in Nicaragua, having antecedents going back to 
the 1940s, but they were much less prevalent and violent than today, in fact disappearing 
completely from view during the first half of the 1980s, partly as a result of military 
conscription, but also because of the extensive organised community vigilance in urban 
neighbourhoods promoted by the Sandinista regime. Pandillas began to reappear slowly 
towards the end of the decade, but the end of the civil war in 1990 precipitated a veritable 
explosion in gang formation. Many of the members of this new wave of pandillerismo were 
youths aged 16 to 18 years old who had been demobilized or discharged from both the 
Sandinista Popular Army and the Contra forces. Individuals who became pandilleros during 
the early 1990s whom I interviewed all mentioned the same general reasons for becoming 
pandilleros: the change of regime in 1990 led to a devaluation of their social status, which as 
conscripts defending the Nation or as “freedom fighters”, had been high within their 
respective social contexts, and forming a pandilla had been a means of reaffirming 
themselves vis-à-vis a wider society that seemed to very rapidly “forget” them, as well as a 
way of recapturing some of the dramatic, yet marking and almost addictive, adrenaline-
charged experiences of war, danger, and death, but also of comradeship and solidarity which 
they had lived through as conscripts or guerrillas. 
One immutable aspect of being a gang member is that it is a finite social role, however, and 
by the mid-1990s the vast majority of the demobilised youth conscripts of 1990 were no 
longer gang members. Generally, at some point between 19 and 23 years of age, pandilleros 
either “become responsible” (“ser responsable”) and integrate into mainstream life and 
society, or else become “tamales”, or professional criminals. In the mid-1990s, some 85-90 
percent of the pandilleros tended to “mature out” of the gang rather than turn to full-time 
crime. This suggests that the pandilla phenomenon in Nicaragua is not just a subculture 
resulting from the strain of not being able to successfully attain mainstream values,35 as might 
be thought from the conscript pandilleros’ experience. Rather, the fact that the overwhelming 
majority of pandilleros do eventually integrate mainstream life and society implies that they 
actually share mainstream values.36 This was well reflected by an ex-pandillero called Elvis 
                                                 
33  See Policía Nacional de Nicaragua, Boletín de la Actividad Delictiva , 32 (2001), at 
http://www.policia.gob.ni/boletin32.htm. 
34  See J. J. Sosa Melendez & J. L. Rocha, ‘Las pandillas en Nicaragua’, in ERIC, IDESO, IDIES, IUDOP, 
Maras y Pandillas en Centroamérica, volume 1, Managua: UCA Publicaciones, 2001. 
35  The notion of 'strain' was originally developed by Robert K. Merton to explain the social consequences of 
there existing a gap between certain groups and individuals' culturally induced aspirations for economic success 
and structurally distributed possibilities of achievement. He used it to explain why criminal behaviour patterns 
emerged in society (R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, New York, NY: The Free Press, 1949). 
See A. K. Cohen, Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1955, for an 
exemplification of this line of argument specifically in relation to US gangs. 
36  This is not to say that a pandilla  does not constitute a locus of particular values and cosmological reference 
points. However, as Hannerz has argued, an individual’s “cultural repertoire” is largely situational (Soulside: 
Inquiries into Ghetto Culture and Community, New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). Inevitably, 
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when I asked him in 2002 why most of the 1996-97 gang members were no longer gang 
members:  
The majority of those who were pandilleros then now have children, Dennis, and 
when you have children, you of course want to distance yourself from the whole 
pandilla thing, you know that you have to work in order to support your family, 
you’ve got to become like everybody else and you can’t hang out in the streets 
anymore. 
At the same time, the continued existence – and indeed growth – of the gang phenomenon in 
Nicaragua since 1990 indicates that it possesses a certain structural autonomy. Although the 
systematic process of “maturing out” of the gang could plausibly suggest that pandillerismo 
constitutes something of a rite of passage for Nicaraguan youth, this idea is undermined by 
the fact that not all Nicaraguan youth join gangs.37 For example, in 1996-97, the barrio Luis 
Fanor Hernández pandilla integrated only about 15 percent of neighbourhood youth aged 
between 7 and 22 years old. These youths originated indiscriminately from richer and poorer 
neighbourhood households, and other stereotypical ‘determinants’ or ‘risk factors’, such as 
family fragmentation, domestic violence, migration, or alcoholism, were not significant in 
explaining gang membership. The only element that systematically affected membership was 
religious, as there were no evangelical Protestant youths in the pandilla. In many ways, this is 
hardly surprising since many of the activities associated with being a pandillero – being 
violent, stealing, drinking, smoking, or taking drugs – were in direct contradiction with the 
teachings of evangelical Protestantism. Moreover, Evangelical Protestant churches provided a 
clear alternative organisational framework for their members, thereby constituting an 
alternative collective form to the gang for any youth members.  
At the same time, however, other than the gang and Evangelical Protestant churches, and 
small networks of friends and intermittent groups coming together in order to play basketball 
or baseball, there were no alternative collective organisational forms for non-pandillero youth 
in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, 38 which ultimately seems only explainable as a reflection of 
the widespread lack of trust, and processes of social breakdown and atomisation. From this 
perspective, pandillas can plausibly be seen either as constituting the last rampart of social 
collectivity in a wider context of generalised distrust and social atomisation, or alternatively 
as a desperate adaptation to the general Nicaraguan context of chronic violence and social 
breakdown. Rather than attempting to establish a series of determinations in order to answer 
this question, however, what is perhaps more important is to provide a sense of the varied 
intertwined factors underlying pandillerismo. This is particularly important because while 
                                                                                                                                                        
because pandilleros do not solely socialize within the gang, but also with family and other non-pandillero 
individuals in the barrio, they will be exposed to mainstream culture, and it will enter their individual 
repertoires, and will even most probably be “used” in relation to practices that do not touch directly on the gang 
sphere of activities. But while they are in the gang, it is the social role of pandillero  that is the primary one, and 
so mainstream cultural repertoires will constitute a secondary cultural resource for gang members compared to 
their pandillero  cultural repertoire. “Maturing out”, fro m such a perspective, signals a reversal of a pandillero 's 
hierarchy of referential repertoires. 
37  Moreover, the process of “maturing out” is something that has been observed almost universally in studies of 
youth gangs around the world, and seems part of a more general youth group dynamic (See H. C. Covey, S. 
Menard & R. J. Franzese, Juvenile Gangs, Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1992, for a 
comprehensive survey). 
38  There were arguably two more general partial exceptions to this, namely the labour market and school. Until 
the age of 16-17 years old, youths’ experiences of the labour market tended to be sporadic, however, and the 
school dropout rate was extremely high, particularly once primary school had been completed. It should also be 
noted that education participation rates of young females was significantly higher than those of young males, 
especially at the secondary school level. 
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Nicaraguan pandillerismo is a persistent phenomenon, it is also one that has changed 
radically over the past half decade, as I hope will become clear from the case study of the 
barrio Luis Fanor Hernández pandilla and its violent practices that I present in the next two 
sections of this paper, first as it was in 1996-97, and then as it had become in 2002. 
 
The barrio Luis Fanor Hernández pandilla in 1996-97 
In 1996-97, the neighbourhood Luis Fanor Hernández pandilla was made up of about 100 
youths, all males aged between 7 and 22 years old. The gang was subdivided into distinct age 
and geographical subgroups. There were three age cohorts – the 7 to 12 years olds, the 13 to 
17 years olds, and those 18 years old and over – and three geographical subgroups, 
respectively associated with the central area of the neighbourhood, the “abajo” (or West) side 
of the neighbourhood, and the “arriba” (or East) side of the neighbourhood. Groups were 
approximately of equal size: geographically, they ranged between 25-35 individuals, and 
within this each of the subgroups divided into three age cohorts of 7 to 12 individuals each. 
The different geographical subgroups had distinct names, respectively “los de la Calle Ocho” 
(named after the alleyway where this group tended to congregate), “los Cancheros” (because 
of a “cancha”, or playing field – if only in name, because all it was in fact was a stretch of 
relatively un-potholed road – on that side of the barrio) and “los Dragones” (because all its 
members had a dragon tattoo).  
These different subgroups generally operated separately, except in the context of gang 
warfare, when they would come together in order to defend the neighbourhood or attack 
another. At the same time, even if the different groups were very autonomous, the individual 
gang members always qualified themselves members of a generic neighbourhood pandilla, 
which was called “Los Sobrevivientes”, in reference to “La Sobrevivencia”, the 
neighbourhood’s pre-revolutionary name. There also existed a notion of generic 
neighbourhood pandilla territory, spanning the whole of the neighbourhood and some of the 
neighbouring wastelands, despite its variable occupation by different geographical subgroups 
and age-cohorts. Moreover, none of the subgroups, whether age- or geography-determined, 
ever fought each other, although fights did occasionally break out between individuals. 
Much of pandilla activity involved acts of violence. Not all of the gang’s behaviour patterns 
involved violence, of course, but in many ways, it was the group’s distinguishing feature, 
setting them apart from other youth in the neighbourhood.39 There were two major forms of 
gang violence: delinquency and warfare. Different age groups were involved in different 
delinquent activities, from low-level pickpocketing and stealing by the youngest, mugging 
and shoplifting by the middle group, to armed robbery and assault by the oldest. A golden 
rule of gang delinquency common to all groups, however, was not to prey on local 
neighbourhood inhabitants, and in fact to actively protect them from outside thieves, robbers, 
and pandilleros. This happened frequently, although it has to be said that the barrio gang 
                                                 
39  There existed a distinct pandillero sartorial ‘fashion’, which included wearing one’s t-shirt inside out, 
sporting an earring and tattoo, or having a partially shaved head, for example, but all of these practices were 
shared with various segments of the non-pandillero  youth population. Similarly, other popular non-violent gang 
activities such as smoking marijuana, sniffing glue, drinking heavily, or hanging out on street corners were also 
shared with other segments of both youth and non-youth population, and consequently cannot be said to 
constitute distinguishing features. In many ways, this is not surprising, as pandilleros are inevitably situated 
within a wider youth culture, with which they both conform and contrast. While they naturally engaged in the 
usual activities of youth – they talked, joked, exchanged stories, listened to music, danced, drank, and smoked – 
they also regularly engaged in other violent and socially disruptive activities, and it is this that distinguished 
them from other youth. 
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members were not always effective in providing adequate protection. During the course of 
my fieldwork in the barrio in 1996-97, three inhabitants of the neighbourhood died as a result 
of delinquency by pandilleros from other barrios. In addition, one barrio Luis Fanor 
Hernández pandillero died whilst attempting an assault in another neighbourhood.   
The dynamics of delinquency were clearly social rather than economic. Even if the revenue 
from delinquent activities was not inconsiderable, amounting on average to some 450 
córdobas (US$50) per month – approximately equivalent to about two thirds of the average 
household’s monthly income in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández in 1996-97 – it was not as 
important as having a tale to tell the rest of the gang afterwards, with the money or whatever 
had been stolen becoming a symbol of the deed for all to see. Moreover, pandilleros never 
contributed the illicit revenue to their family economy, but always spent it quickly, on 
cigarettes, alcohol, glue (to sniff), or marijuana, to be consumed communally by the gang 
group. As the French anthropologist Michel Maffesoli has pointed out, such collective 
activity contributes to the construction of a sense of identity, based on “a social cement 
constituted of common emotions and shared pleasures”. 40 
Although gang delinquency was more prevalent than gang warfare, the latter was 
undoubtedly the more spectacular form of violence, as conflicts between rival gangs 
transformed parts of Managua into quasi-war zones, with gangs fighting each other with 
weaponry ranging from sticks, stones, and knives to AK-47s, fragmentation grenades, and 
mortars, often with dramatic consequences both for gang members and local populations. 
During the year of my stay in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández in 1996-97, fourteen distinct gang 
wars affected the neighbourhood, leaving three gang members and at least two 
neighbourhood inhabitants dead (as well as several hundred injured). Although these gang 
wars initially seemed highly chaotic, they in fact displayed very regular patterns, sometimes 
almost to the point of being ritualised. The pandillas organized themselves into “companies”, 
which operated strategically, expertly covering each other whenever advancing or retreating. 
There was generally a “reserve force”, and although weapons were an individual’s own 
property, each gang member was distributed amongst the different “companies” in order to 
balance out fire-power, except when a high powered “attack commando” was needed for a 
specific tactical purpose. Conflicts revolved around either attacking or protecting a 
neighbourhood, with fighting generally specifically focused either on harming or limiting 
damage to both neighbourhood infrastructure and inhabitants. 
The first battle of a pandilla war typically involved fighting with stones and bare hands, but 
each new battle involved an escalation of weaponry, first to sticks and staffs, then to knives 
and broken bottles, then mortars, and eventually to guns, AK-47s, and fragmentation 
grenades. Although the rate of escalation could vary, its sequence never did – i.e. pandillas 
did not begin their wars immediately with mortars, guns, or AK-47. Moreover, battles 
involved specific patterns of behaviour on the part of active participants, intimately linked to 
what the gang members called “living in the shadow of death” – “somos muerte arriba” in 
the original Spanish. 41 On the one hand, this expression reflected the very real fact that gang 
members often found themselves in dangerous situations, but was also more than just a 
corporeal state of being, as gang members used it to describe their attitudes and practices. For 
them, “living in the shadow of death” entailed displaying specific behaviour patterns in 
battle, which included flying in the face of danger and exposing oneself purposefully in order 
                                                 
40  See M. Maffesoli, Du Nomadisme: Vagabondages Initiatiques, Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 1997, p.116. 
41  My translation is not literal, as I feel that the range of connotations that the expression entails are not 
adequately conveyed by a more verbatim rendition of “somos muerte arriba” as “we have death above us”. 
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to taunt the enemy, taking risks and displaying bravado, whatever the odds and whatever the 
consequences, almost daring death to do its best. It meant not asking oneself questions or 
calculating one’s chances, but simply going ahead and acting in a cheerfully exuberant 
manner, with style and panache.  
In many ways, this idea of “living in the shadow of death” can arguably be seen as a primary 
constitutive practice for the pandilleros, playing a fundamental role in the construction of the 
individual gang member self. At the same time, gang wars also contributed to the constitution 
of the gang as a group, reaffirming the collective unit by emphasizing the primordial human 
distinction between “us” and “them”. But pandilla warfare was arguably also about a broader 
form of social construction that went beyond the gang group or individual and related to the 
wider neighbourhood community. The pandilleros qualified their violence as being primarily 
motivated by their “love” for the neighbourhood, justifying their fighting other gangs as 
representing an “act of love” for their neighbourhood. As one of them called Julio put it: 
You show the neighbourhood that you love it by putting yourself in danger for 
people, by protecting them from other pandillas… You look after the 
neighbourhood; you help them, keep them safe… 
 
This is not as implausible as may initially seem. In many ways, the ritualised nature of 
pandilla warfare can be conceived as a kind of restraining mechanism; escalation is a positive 
constitutive process, in which each stage calls for a greater but definite intensity of action, 
and is always therefore under the actors’ control. At the same time, the escalation process 
also provided local neighbourhood inhabitants with a framework through which to organize 
their lives, acting as an “early warning system”. As such, pandilla wars can be conceived as 
having constituted “scripted performances” which offered a means of circumscribing what 
Hannah Arendt has aptly termed the “all-pervading unpredictability” of violence.42 Although 
pandilla wars clearly had deleterious effects for the local population, these were indirect, as 
gangs never directly victimised the local population of their own neighbourhood, in fact 
protecting them instead during gang wars. The threat to local neighbourhood populations 
stemmed from other gangs, whom the local gang would engage with in a prescribed manner 
in order to limit the scope of violence in its own neighbourhood, thereby creating a kind of 
predictable “safe haven” for local inhabitants. 
In a wider context of chronic violence and insecurity, this function was a positive one, and 
even if it was not always one hundred percent effective – as mentioned above, bystanders 
were frequently injured and even killed in the crossfire of gang wars – local neighbourhood 
inhabitants very much recognized it as such. As Don Sergio put it:  
The pandilla looks after the neighbourhood and screws others; it protects us and 
allows us to feel a little bit safer, to live our lives a little bit more easily... Gangs 
are not a good thing, and it’s their fault that we have to live with all this 
insecurity, but that’s a problem of pandillerismo in general, not of our gang here 
in the barrio. They protect us, help us – without them, things would be much 
worse for us. 
 
                                                 
42  H. Arendt, On Violence, New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1969, p.5. 
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As a result, members of the local community did not call the Police during gang wars, and 
nor did they ever denounce gang members.43 Indeed, although there existed a certain 
ambivalence towards the gang phenomenon among local neighbourhood inhabitants,44 there 
also existed a definite sense of identification with the local gang and its violent exploits, 
which in practice provided the principal anchor point for a sense of a collective barrio 
identity in an otherwise fractured community. From this perspective, the pandilla offered the 
neighbourhood much more than just a certain sense of security, but in fact constituted itself as 
a primary symbolic index of community, its “care” for the neighbourhood standing in sharp 
contrast with the wider atomisation and social breakdown. 
 
The barrio Luis Fanor Hernández pandilla in 2002 
When I returned to barrio Luis Fanor Hernández in 2002, the pandilla had changed radically. 
The gang was now constituted by a single unitary group of just 18 youths aged 17 to 23 years 
old known as “Los Dragones”. The groups’ violent and illicit activities had evolved; in 
particular, the gang was now intimately connected with a thriving local neighbourhood drug 
economy involving cocaine, especially in the form of crack, known in Nicaragua as “la 
piedra” (“the stone”).45 According to my informants, cocaine began to be traded in the barrio 
around mid-1999, initially on a small-scale by just one individual but rapidly expanding into 
a three-tiered pyramidal drug economy by the first half of 2000.46 At the top of the pyramid 
                                                 
43  At the same time, the Police rarely came if called, often only doing so if the caller indicated that he or she 
was willing to “pay for the gasoline”. Generally, as noted previously, the Nicaraguan Police is under-funded and 
badly equipped. Partly as a result of this, they were not a very visible presence in the neighbourhood in 1996-97, 
patrolling very infrequently, with the sole exception of a three week period in January 1997 immediately 
following President Arnoldo Alemán’s accession, when in typical populist fashion he unblocked special funds 
for the Police to buy supplies of gasoline and ammunition in order to conduct an anti-pandilla  campaign. This 
operation came to an abrupt end when supplies ran out and no more funding was forthcoming. In 2002, the 
Police was a somewhat more visible presence, patrolling the neighbourhood by car more or less regularly, but 
hardly in a very effective manner, as patrols seldom stopped, except, as occurred in two cases that I was able to 
observe, to buy drugs from neighbourhood drug dealers. There is some evidence to suggest that between 1997 
and 2002, the Nicaraguan Police, and indeed the Nicaraguan state in general, sporadically achieved higher levels 
of institutional presence, but generally, it is probably fair to say that it has constituted a rather absent or 
ineffective manifestation at the barrio level during the past decade and a half. To a certain extent, following 
Callaghy (‘The State as Lame Leviathan’, in Z. Ergas (ed.), The African State in Transition, New York: 
Macmillan, 1987) and Zartmann (Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), the Nicaraguan state can plausibly be characterised as a “lame leviathan”, 
or in other words, a weak institution with only a limited or occasional reach into wider society (See Rodgers, 
2000, for a more detailed description of the Nicaraguan state’s debility).  
44  As Don Sergio above makes clear, neighbourhood inhabitants made a clear dis tinction between the gang 
phenomenon in general and the local manifestation of the gang. While unequivocally critical of the former, they 
were generally positive about the latter. This is not to say that they never had anything negative to say about the 
gang – certainly the parents of gang members frequently worried about their offspring, for example – but there 
was no fear of the local gang in the neighbourhood. To a certain extent, one could draw a parallel with 
Hobsbawm’s notion of “social banditry”, with the local gang constituting an “honourable” form of banditry 
within a wider context of “unsocial banditry” (Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements 
in the 19th and 20th Centuries, New York: Norton, 1959). 
45  Cocaine is usually distributed in two forms: either as a white crystalline powder or as an off-white chunky 
material. The powder form is cocaine hydrochloride, which is generally snorted, while the chunky form, crack, 
is a ready-to-use freebase, usually a combination of cocaine and sodium bicarbonate boiled in water that is 
normally heated and the vapours inhaled or else smoked. Crack is much less expensive than cocaine powder, 
and is frequently referred to as “the poor man’s cocaine”. 
46  Although cocaine and crack were available in Managua in the mid-1990s, they were not widespread. The 
subsequent expansion of the cocaine trade in Nicaragua has both international and national explanations. 
Internationally, the mid to late 1990s saw a diversification of drug trafficking routes fro m Colombia to North 
America as a result of improved law enforcement efforts in the Caribbean. Flows along the Mexican-Central 
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was the “narco”, or the “big man”, who brought cocaine into the neighbourhood. The narco 
only wholesaled his goods, in particular to the half a dozen “púsheres” in the 
neighbourhood.47 Púsheres then either re-sold the cocaine they bought from the narco in 
smaller quantities or else “cooked” it into crack which they sold from their houses, mainly to 
a regular clientele which included “muleros”, the bottom rung of the drug dealing pyramid. 
Muleros sold crack to all-comers on the barrio street corners, generally in the form of small 
“paquetes” which cost 10 córdobas (US$0.70) each and contained two “fixes”, known as 
“tuquitos”. There were 19 muleros in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, 16 of whom were 
Dragones pandilleros – the two non-mulero pandilleros were brothers of one who was, and 
shared in his profits – and the other three ex-gang members.48  
The Dragones muleros hung about on neighbourhood street corners as a group, waiting for 
potential clients to come by, and taking turns selling their drugs to them. The rewards of such 
small-scale dealing were substantial: depending on turnover and auxiliary activities, an 
individual mulero could make between 5,000-8,500 córdobas (US$350-600) profit per 
month, equivalent to between three and five times the average Nicaraguan wage. This was 
considerably higher than in 1996-97, and partly as a result pandillero spending habits had 
changed compared to the past. Although a significant proportion of gang members’ 
delinquent income was still spent on items associated with conspicuous consumption such as 
alcohol, drugs, and cigarettes – as well as new commodities such as gold chains, rings, 
expensive watches, powerful hi- fi systems, and wide screen televisions, amongst others – a 
sizeable proportion was also being used to improve the material conditions of gang members’ 
lives and those of their families. This was starkly reflected in the infrastructural disparities 
that existed between drug dealer and non-drug dealer homes in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, 
with the former displaying major improvements, including being generally made out of 
concrete blocks rather than wood. Overall, some 40 percent of the neighbourhood seemed to 
be benefiting from the drug economy in one way or another, either through direct 
involvement, or else indirectly, by being related to or employed by somebody who was 
involved. 
At the same time, although many in the neighbourhood benefited from the drugs trade, there 
also existed a generalised ambivalence towards it among barrio inhabitants. On the one hand, 
this was due to the physical effects of regula r crack consumption on users. Crack is a 
powerfully addictive drug, and has very serious consequences on the health of regular users. 
                                                                                                                                                        
American corridor increased, and due to its proximity to the Colombian Caribbean island of San Andrés, 
Nicaragua is geographically a natural first trans-shipment point within this transit zone. Nationally, in late 1998 
Nicaragua was devastated by Hurricane Mitch, suffering major infrastructural damage and resource drainage, 
which have had highly negative consequences on the already limited capabilities of local law enforcement 
organisations. At the same time, post-Mitch reconstruction efforts focused mainly on improving transport links 
within Nicaragua, and most notably the Pan-American highway, and the concomitant increase in the volume of 
traffic along this route has made it easier to move drug shipments across the Nicaragua-Honduras border 
undetected. Within Nicaragua, drugs are transported from the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua to Managua, and 
those facilitating conveyance along the way take a cut of the shipments in order to make money distributing 
locally. There are consequently thriving local drug economies, especially in Bluefields and the Lagunas de 
Perlas area, as well as in Managua. See D. Rodgers, ‘Cracking Development: The Political Economy of the 
Drugs Trade in Contemporary Nicaragua’, Crisis States Programme Working Paper, London: Development 
Research Centre, LSE, forthcoming, for more detail. 
47  The narco also supplied púsheres from other neighbourhoods, barrio Luis Fanor Hernández being one of the 
principal provider neighbourhoods of Managua’s burgeoning cocaine trade, into which it arrived into the city 
and from where it was distributed. Others included barrios Santa Ana, San Judas, and El Recreo. 
48  Indeed, all the various actors of the drugs trade were linked to the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández pandilla in 
one way or another. The narco was an ex-gang member from the early 1990s  and all the púsheres were either 
ex-pandilleros from the mid-1990s or else closely related to ex-pandilleros. 
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In particular, smoking crack can cause pulmonary abnormalities including lung trauma and 
bleeding, respiratory arrest, as well as potentially lead to cardiac arrest and seizures. Some 
half dozen individuals in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández had died since 1999 from causes that 
were widely attributed to excessive crack consumption, and addicts certainly often displayed 
grotesque wasting effects, to the extent that they were popularly referred to as “gárgolas” 
(“gargoyles”). Intriguingly, crack users were also frequently described as “son muerte abajo”, 
which would literally translate as “they have death below them”. The expression was 
explained to me by informants as denoting that crack users are inevitably condemned, that 
they cannot escape death, which is an interesting reversal of the expression “somos muerte 
arriba” which the barrio pandilleros used to describe their predicament in 1996-97. 
On the other hand, and more importantly, this generalised ambivalence was also related to the 
fact that crack consumption had clearly heightened the local population’s sense of insecurity 
in the neighbourhood. Although drug consumption had been widespread in the barrio in 
1996-97, particularly within the gang, the main drug consumed at the time had been 
marijuana, which has very different neurological and psychiatric effects to crack, as a drug 
user called Hugo explained:  
Crack makes you crazy, like you’re flying, and then when you come down, it’s 
brutal, you’ll do anything to get another fix, even rob your neighbours, your 
friends, your own family even… it’s not like marijuana, which just makes you 
feel at ease with everybody, happy, you know… crack takes you over completely 
and makes you do what it wants… 
 
In particular, crack makes users extremely violent, a pandillero called Chucki emphasised:  
This drug, crack, it makes you really violent, I tell you… when I smoke up and 
somebody insults me, I immediately want to kill them, to get a machete and do 
them in, to defend myself… I don’t stop and think, talk to them, ask them why or 
whatever… I don't even recognise them, all I want to do is kill them… it’s the 
drug, I tell you, that’s where the violence comes from… 
 
Not surprisingly, perhaps, there were clearly many more acts of spontaneous, unpredictable 
public violence occurring in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández in 2002 compared to 1996-97, and 
the majority were linked to crack consumption, as Adilia explained: 
The problem is that now, anybody could be a potential danger, if they’ve smoked 
some crack, any time… you can’t know what they’re going to do, with this drug 
people become more violent, more aggressive, they don’t care about anything, 
they don’t recognise you... you don’t know what they’re thinking or even if 
they’re thinking at all, they could just kill you like that, without a thought … 
 
Although they were by no means the only crack users in the neighbourhood, the gang 
definitely constituted a privileged site of crack consumption, and all the gang members were 
crack users. They were clearly involved in a large proportion of the drug-related violence 
affecting the barrio, and it was extremely frequent to see drugged pandilleros stopping 
neighbourhood inhabitants in the barrio streets and asking for a few córdobas in order to buy 
another fix. If their request was refused or ignored, they often became violent and attempted 
to rip off watches and necklaces. At the same time, however, this heightened sense of 
insecurity and the concomitant ambivalence towards the gang were the result of more than 
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just their crack consumption and its attendant consequences. The pandilleros in 2002 were an 
intimidating and threatening presence in the neighbourhood, no longer imbued with an ethos 
of “loving” the barrio, as a gang member called Roger made clear: 
We couldn’t give a fuck about the barrio inhabitants anymore… If they get 
attacked, if they’re robbed, if they have problems, who cares? We don’t lift a 
finger to help them anymore, we just laugh instead, hell, we even applaud those 
who are robbing them… Why should we do anything for them? Now we just 
hang out in the streets, smoke crack, and rob, and nothing else! 
 
Although crack consumption was clearly important in explaining this changed behaviour 
pattern, to a larger extent it was arguably a consequence of the gang’s intimate association 
with the local drugs trade. Even if as muleros, gang members constituted the lower rung of 
the local drug economy, and moreover conducted their drug dealing transactions on an 
individual basis, the gang as a group acted to ensure the proper functioning and protection of 
the barrio drug economy in general. They would ensure that transactions proceeded smoothly 
and generally provided security services to the narco and to púsheres. At a general level, the 
gang had instituted a veritable regime of terror in the neighbourhood. Pandilleros were a very 
visible presence in the neighbourhood, strutting about the streets, menacingly displaying guns 
and machetes, and often verbally warning barrio inhabitants of the potential consequences 
were they to denounce them or others involved in the local drugs trade, and sometimes 
backing up these threats with violence, as Doña Yolanda described:  
Five years ago, you could trust the pandilleros, but not anymore… They’ve 
become corrupted due to this drug, crack… They threaten, attack people from the 
barrio now, rob them of whatever they have, whoever they are… They never did 
that before… They used to protect us, look out for us, but now they don’t care, 
they only look out for themselves, for their illegal business (bisnes)… People are 
scared, you’ve got to be careful what you say or what you do, because otherwise 
they’ll attack you… Even if you say nothing, they might still come and rob you, 
come into your home, steal a chair, food, some clothes, whatever they can find… 
They often do, you know it’s them, but you can’t blame them, otherwise they’ll 
burn your house down… It's their way of telling you to be careful... If you say 
anything to them, if you do anything, if you denounce them, then they’ll come at 
night and wreak their vengeance... We live in terror here in the barrio, you have 
to be scared or else you’re sure to be sorry... 
 
Gang members would enforce contracts, roughing up recalcitrant clients if the narco or 
púsheres asked them to, as well as guard drug shipments as they were moved both within and 
outside the barrio, and generally actively made sure that clients could enter the 
neighbourhood unmolested by either the local population or outsiders. For example, there 
was an incident during my stay in February-March 2002 when the gang collectively beat up 
the adult son of an elderly neighbourhood inhabitant who lived next to a púsher’s house, as a 
warning after she had harangued and thrown a bucket of water on crack buyers who had 
knocked on her door instead of her neighbour’s. Similarly, in early 2001 a group of muleros 
from the nearby barrio Nosara spatially occupied one of the entrances to barrio Luis Fanor 
Hernández in order to intercept crack clients; when they realised what had happened, the 
Dragones pandilla swiftly attacked them armed with guns and shot two dead and left three 
critically injured. At the same time, however, the ritualised gang wars of the past had 
completely disappeared, because they might have discouraged or made it difficult for 
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potential clients to come into the barrio, and were therefore detrimental to the gang’s 
changed preoccupations as a key feature of the local drug economy. 
 
Gangs, violence, and social change in urban Nicaragua 
There are clear links between the two manifestations of the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández 
pandilla described above. Most obviously, the gang members in 2002 had all been members 
of the 13 to 17 years old cohort of the Dragones subgroup of the Sobrevivientes gang in 
1996-97. There was also continuity in the two groups’ behaviour patterns. The gang in 2002 
continued to occupy the same geographical space as the gang in 1996-97, and gang members 
were heavily involved in drug use both in 1996-97 and 2002, albeit of different drugs. 
Finally, both groups were violent social forms. At the same time, however, there are also very 
clear differences between the two expressions of the gang, particularly in relatio n to their 
violence. In 1996-97, the pandilla’s violent practices were arguably social in nature. The 
gang as an organisation and its violence can be conceived as having constituted elements of 
an institutional arrangement that constructed a local form of collective social order within a 
wider Nicaraguan context of violence, insecurity, and social breakdown. It did so at multiple 
levels – the individual pandillero, the gang group, the local community – using violence as 
the cement for this process of social and symbolic structuring, but at the same time also doing 
so in a reduced, exclusive manner, taking the barrio as its ontological point of reference for 
the constitution of this collective social order rather than a broader form of “social 
imaginary”, such as the city or the nation-state, for example.49  
Following James Holston and Arjun Appadurai – who draw on the work of T. H. Marshall – 
it could be argued that Nicaraguan pandillas in 1996-97 represented a form of “insurgent 
citizenship”, that they were emergent “social morphologies” attempting to force “a 
reconsideration of the basic principles of membership” in society in a wider context where 
the traditional mediator of collective association – the Nicaraguan nation-state – maintained 
only “an envelope of citizenship”. 50 Gangs and their violent practices arguably provided local 
neighbourhood populations with a concrete sense of belonging to a definite, albeit reduced, 
collective entity which they did not have at the city and national level due to the chronic and 
widespread insecurity pervading Nicaragua. At the same time, however, such a radical form 
of community as was provided by the pandilla and its violent practices in 1996-97 was 
clearly more palliative than enabling, allowing local neighbourhood inhabitants to live more 
securely within the context of a limited, very much bounded social unit, but little else. 
Borrowing from T. H. Marshall’s original discussion of citizenship, one might say that as 
such, pandillerismo constituted a “formal” rather than a “substantive” form of social 
                                                 
49  The notion of “social imaginary” derives from the work of Charles Taylor (‘Modern social imaginaries’, 
Public Culture, 14:1 (2002), pp.91-124). It refers to the self-understandings that are constitutive of society. The 
concept refers not so much to ideas as to institutional structure: “the social imaginary is not a set of ideas; rather 
it is what enables, through making sense of, the practices of a society” (Taylor, 2002, p.91). In this sense it is 
about the broader issue of how people conceive and think about social reality, “the ways in which people 
imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their 
fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these 
expectations… the social imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a 
widely shared sense of legitimacy” (Taylor, 2002, p.106). The nation-state – understood here as an “imagined 
community” (See B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
London: Verso, 1983) – is probably the most paradigmatic of “social imaginaries”. 
50  J. Holsten & A. Appadurai, ‘Introduction: Cities and Citizenship’, in J. Holston (ed), Cities and Citizenship, 
Durham, NC & London: Duke University Press, 1999, p.2. 
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structuring, which did not empower the local neighbourhood population to do anything other 
than survive.51 
By 2002 the pandilla had changed radically. Although the gang and its violence clearly 
continued to organise the local neighbourhood community in 2002, they did so in a very 
different way. In particular, the gang’s violent practices were now arguably economically 
rather than socially driven. The gang had become a key element of the local drug economy, 
with individual gang members having become drug dealing entrepreneurs and the gang 
group’s violence now focused on ensuring the unimpeded circulation and exchange of both 
drugs and customers within the neighbourhood, rather than the protection of the 
neighbourhood community. As such, the gang and its violence can be conceived as having 
constituted elements of a new institutional arrangement that promoted a localised process of 
capital accumulation. In a wider Nicaraguan context, where economic opportunities are 
lacking, unemployment levels are extremely high, job creation is scarce, and the labour 
market is highly segmented, the emergence of localised forms of informal economic 
provisioning is not surprising. That promoted by the pandilla and its violence is a limited 
form, however, based on monopoly control of a resource by a small group operating for its 
own exclusive advantage rather than constituting a generalised opportunity for economic 
enrichment, thereby promoting a process of socio-economic differentiation.  
To a certain extent, this process of capital accumulation bears comparison to Karl Marx’s 
famous notion of “primitive accumulation”, which he developed to explain how capitalist 
accumulation begins, namely through the violent creation of two distinct classes, one of 
capitalist producers and sellers, and the other of dispossessed labourers and consumers. 
Capitalism for Marx was not just about money, but was a particular exploitative relationship 
between producers and labourers based on unequal control of the means of production and 
consequently in order to take off, an initial process of socio-economic differentiation was 
necessary. 52 Although the analogy with the concept of “primitive accumulation” is not perfect 
– in particular, the drug dealing elite is not exploiting the non-drug dealing population in the 
way Marx envisioned capitalists exploiting the proletariat – the drugs trade in Nicaragua is 
certainly fuelling the creation of localised entrepreneurial elites in urban neighbourhoods, 
some of whom are in fact beginning to invest their profits in both legal and illegal local 
                                                 
51  T. H. Marshall defines citizenship as “a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All 
who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights  and duties with which the status is endowed” (Class, 
Citizenship, and Social Development, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977 [1950], p.92 ). He makes 
a distinction between formal and substantive aspects of citizenship, however, the former referring to 
membership within a political community such as a nation-state, for example, while substantive aspects of 
citizenship refer to the array of civil, political, socio-economic and cultural rights that individuals possess and 
can exercise, or in other words, the means through which formal citizenship is actualised. As James Holston & 
Teresa Caldeira have highlighted in relation to what they call the “disjunctured democracies” of Latin America 
(‘Democracy, Law, and Violence: Disjunctions of Brazilian Citizenship’, in F. Aguero and J. Stark  (eds), Fault 
Lines of Democratic Governance in the Americas, Miami: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), societies in which 
there exists a gap between the formal and substantive rights tend to be highly elitist and democratic only in 
name, excluding large swathes of the population – generally the poor, but also particular racial or ethnic groups, 
as well a age- and gender-based groups – from both political and economic processes (See also Caldeira, 2001; 
Jelin & Hershberg, 1996; Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, ‘Democracies without Citizenship’, NACLA Report on the 
Americas, 30 (September/October 1996), pp.17-23; and N. Scheper-Hughes & D. Hoffman, ‘Brazilian 
Apartheid: Street Kids and the Struggle for Urban Space’, in N. Scheper-Hughes and C. Sargent (eds), Small 
Wars: The Cultural Politics of Childhood, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 
52  See Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy – volume 1 , translated by B. Fowkes and introduced 
by E. Mandel, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976 [1867], especially chapter 26. 
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economic ventures.53 Whether this will lead to more extensive economic development in the 
same way that “primitive accumulation” leads to the development of capitalism according to 
Marx remains to be seen, but what is eminently clear from the above description of the two 
manifestations of the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang is that it is an organisational form 
whose nature changed radically between 1997 and 2002, and interpreting this transformation 
from one condition to another is critical to understanding what sort of institutional 
arrangement the pandilla and its associated violence are part of. 
 
Institutions, institutional arrangements, and institutional change 
Institutions, according to Geoffrey Hodgson, are “the stuff of socio-economic reality”. 54 They 
are humanly devised sets of rules that affect and govern behavior, coming together into 
arrangements that constrain or enable the constitution of both individual and collective action 
in everyday life. Institutions and institutional arrangements can be both formal and informal, 
and can exist at a macro as well as a micro level, but as Jack Knight emphasizes, they affect 
all aspects of social existence: “from political decision making to economic production and 
exchange to the rules governing personal relationships, institutional arrangements establish 
the framework in which these social interactions take place”.55 Institutional arrangements are 
typically considered to serve particular functions. In particular, they are seen to facilitate 
social interaction by regularizing it – thereby reducing uncertainty – and can be the result of 
both conscious design as well as gradual and unintentional evolution. 
Institutional arrangements are generally considered durable structures, imbued with a certain 
“path dependency” whereby, once established, they will often persist because of inertia and 
the high transaction costs of change.56 The natural state of affairs is therefore for an 
institutional equilibrium to exis t, but this can be disturbed either by exogenous factors leading 
to a change in the institutional environment such as the introduction of new opportunities or 
new players, for example, or by endogenous contradictions within a particular institutional 
arrangement which might be generated by individuals attempting to improve their own 
situation by changing the payoffs associated with certain actions. Both these stimuli can lead 
to changes in the norms and rules associated with a particular institutional arrangement, 
which in turn can lead to institutional change since this will affect the given institutional 
arrangement’s efficient fulfilment of its specific function (function following necessity, 
institutional arrangements will inevitably change when social and physical conditions or 
internal institutional dynamics disrupt existing outcomes). Ultimately, institutional change is 
seen to tend towards the re-establishment of a new equilibrium which accomplishes either a 
changed institutional arrangement’s previous function more efficiently or else achieves a new 
function altogether.57  
As Pranab Bardhan has remarked, however, “an institution’s mere function of serving the 
interests of potential beneficiaries is clearly inadequate in explaining it, just as it is an 
                                                 
53  See Rodgers (forthcoming) for a more detailed discussion of the political economy of the drugs trade in 
Nicaragua.  
54  G. Hodgson, How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Historical Specificity in Social Science, 
London: Routledge, 2001, p.302, cited in J. Harriss, ‘Institutions, Politics and Culture: A Case for “Old” 
Institutionalism in the Study of Historical Change’, DESTIN working paper no. 02-34, London: DESTIN, 2002, 
p.1. 
55  J. Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.1. 
56  See D. C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: W. W. Norton, 1981; and 
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
57  See North (1990) in particular on this point. 
  
19
incompetent detective who tries to explain a murder mystery only by looking for the 
beneficiary and, on that basis alone, proceeds to arrest the heir of the murdered rich man”.58 
Although a particular institutional arrangement can certainly change as a result of the 
emergence of new opportunities or internal contradictions, these do not predetermine the end 
result of this change. At any given time, there always exists a “repertory” of possible 
collective actions at the disposal of social actors, and the ones they choose – social actors are 
not necessarily passive carriers of structural roles – and how these evolve are the result of a 
conjunction of factors that cannot be predicted in a functionally deterministic way. In 
particular, it is important not to focus only on how particular institutional arrangements 
underlie particular social practices at any given time, but also on what it is that makes these 
underlying institutional arrangements realizable at this given time. The building of 
institutional arrangements is not necessarily spontaneous, and when these change, they 
frequently do so incrementally, with new arrangements building on existing ones, even if 
these are not necessarily directly related. Furthermore, institutions are also embedded in 
particular contexts, which will inevitably influence outcomes in varying ways. 
Ultimately, then, the possible paths that processes of social change can take are neither 
obvious nor certain. The challenge of conceptualising institutional change is therefore to 
develop a thoroughly dynamic approach to social transformation that goes beyond simply 
determining whether there has been change in a given institutional arrangement or whether 
there is continuity. As Abner Cohen has rightly pointed out, a continuity in the form of a 
given institutional arrangement does not necessarily automatically entail a continuity of its 
function for the same form can fulfil new functions, while conversely, a change in the form of 
a given institutional arrangement does not necessarily automatically entail a change of its 
function because the same function can be achieved by new forms.59 When comparing 
different types of institutional arrangements what is therefore required is not only that we 
understand what is common and what is different between them, but also what is the basis for 
the development and maintenance of their respective forms and functions. In other words, it 
is not the relationship between a given form and a given function per se that is important, but 
understanding what it is that enables a given institutional arrangement to articulate a given 
function, what are the limitations on this particular arrangement performing this particular 
function, and what are the different factors that can lead to a change either in form or function 
or both.  
From this perspective, explaining the course of institutional change is inevitably closely 
related to what might be termed the “compatibility” between the key elements of an 
institutional arrangement and their context. Of course, this compatibility can be conceived as 
having analytically distinct institutional, organisational, and environmental aspects to it, but it 
is in the conjunction of these different aspects that the most interesting insights into social 
change actually lie. While the emergence of exogenous factors or the endogenous 
contradictions of institutional arrangements are of course important to explaining social 
change, they cannot constitute the basis upon which to explain the specific transformation of 
a given institutional arrangement by themselves. Rather, it is the complex interplay between 
exogenous stimuli, endogenous contradictions, and the specific nature of a given institutional 
arrangement, the nature of its key elements, its particular context, and the agency of the social 
actors it involves that provides us with a real understanding of processes of social change. 
                                                 
58  P. Bardhan, ‘The new institutional economics and development theory: a brief critical assessment’, World 
Development, 17:9 (1989), p.1392, italics in original. 
59  See A. Cohen, ‘Political anthropology: The analysis of the symbolism of power relations’, Man (N.S.), 4:2 
(1969), p.219. 
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This is what the next section of this paper proposes to trace out in relation to the barrio Luis 
Fanor Hernández pandilla. 
 
Tracing the course of institutional change: The evolution of the barrio Luis Fanor 
Hernández pandilla, 1997-2002 
The most immediately obvious reason for the changed nature of the pandilla in 2002 as 
compared to 1996-97 is clearly the emergence of the drugs trade in Nicaragua in the late 
1990s. However, the development of the drug economy does not constitute an explanation as 
such of why the pandilla – as opposed to another organisational form – was able to grasp the 
opportunities provided by the appearance of cocaine at that particular point in time, and why 
this changed pandillerismo as a particular type of institutional arrangement. As the story of 
the evolution of the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández pandilla between 1997 and 2002 in fact 
suggests, the institutional arrangement governing the gang was already changing when 
cocaine became a significant presence in the neighbourhood, and although the latter certainly 
had consequences for the former, the reverse is also true. In particular, the changing nature of 
pandillerismo as an institutional arrangement was having profound effects on the kind of 
organisation the pandilla was, and there was therefore arguably a certain situationally 
specific ‘compatibility’ between the gang as an organisation and the emergent drugs trade. 
According to my informants, the pandilla’s mutation began towards the end of 1997, when 
the Calle Ocho pandilla subgroup fell apart because its entire elder age cohort “matured out” 
of the gang simultaneously. This seems to have occurred following the departure from the 
neighbourhood of a key member of that age cohort a few months previously and the sudden 
death of another. The younger members of the subgroup were absorbed into the two other 
barrio pandilla subgroups and the Calle Ocho subgroup effectively ceased to exist. This 
polarisation of the gang into two subgroups led to a qualitative change in the gang’s 
dynamics. The tripartite structure of the gang had constituted a stable system, holding each 
subgroup in a balance of power. Binary structures, on the other hand, are inherently 
oppositional, and there rapidly developed a strong sense of rivalry between the two remaining 
subgroups, reflected mainly in a heightened sense of subgroup territoriality. This culminated 
in areas of the barrio dominated by one group becoming no-go areas for the other and vice-
versa, and the tension was further heightened towards the end of 1998 when the Cancheros 
subgroup changed its name to “Los Killers” (because several members of the subgroup were 
involved in a series of murders). Around Easter 1999, this tension erupted into a full- fledged 
conflict between the Killers and the Dragones. As one Dragones gang member called Ronnie 
explained to me: 
the conflict was inevitable. They [the Killers] believed they were the masters, you 
understand. They believed they were better than us. But here, in the pandilla, 
everybody’s equal, you can’t have a situation where some are better than others, 
we’re all equal, you understand, nobody is better than anybody else. In the 
pandillero language, we say that they were shitting bigger than their arses (se la 
tiraban aquí del culo), that they were getting too big for their boots. They were 
trying to put one up on us, which wasn’t right, you understand, and so we had to 
make them respect us, to make them understand … We had to make them respect 
what we call the law of ice (la ley del hielo). What this means is that when 
somebody tries to put one up on you, if they try to dominate you, then you have 
to give it to them, you’ve got to hit them, slash them, beat them up real good, you 
know, smash their head against the wall until they’re covered in blood, defeated, 
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dead, perhaps, at any rate so that they'll never defy you again. That’s what you 
have to do to make them respect the law of ice, as we say here in Nicaragua, so 
that’s why the conflict between us was inevitable. 
 
What actually sparked off the conflict was that a family with four youths belonging to the 
Killers moved from the West side of the barrio, which was the Killers’ side, to the East side, 
which was the Dragones’ side. The Dragones subgroup wanted nothing to do with the four 
Killers pandilleros, but at the same time gave them an ultimatum to either leave the Killers or 
leave their side of the barrio. Refusing the Dragones’ demands on their members, the Killers 
decided to take pre-emptive action and attacked the Dragones by surprise one evening. The 
Dragones had fortuitously been planning a surprise attack themselves later that night and so 
had their weapons at hand, and the fight quickly escalated into a raging gun battle. The 
Dragones acquired the upper hand and went on a rampage in the barrio. Somewhat 
miraculously, there were no deaths, but almost one hundred pandilleros and barrio 
inhabitants were injured, including one Killers gang member who had an ear cut off, whilst 
his father lost an eye trying to intervene. Many of the houses on the West side of the barrio 
(the Killers’ side) were also damaged, including several that were burnt down with Molotov 
cocktails. 
According to both gang and non-gang informants, this conflagration was considered “too 
much” for the barrio population. Several families called the Police and denounced the dozen 
or so more notorious Dragones pandilleros. Six were arrested with the active cooperation of 
neighbourhood inhabitants and put in prison to be tried, while another half dozen fled the 
barrio. When the case against the six who had been caught was due to come to court, 
however, those Dragones gang members that remained in the neighbourhood threatened the 
barrio inhabitants who were pressing charges with reprisals, and the case was quickly 
dropped. This unprecedented episode profoundly marked the barrio pandilleros and 
fundamentally changed their attitude towards the barrio population. As a Dragones 
pandillero called Roger put it:  
 
the people in the barrio showed themselves to be hypocrites then, all of a sudden 
they hated us, and they turned against us, but before that we had been respected, 
liked, because we helped and protected them… without us they couldn’t survive! 
Now they don’t want to know about anything, they’ll fucking denounce us if they 
get half a chance! Why should we do anything for such treacherous people? 
 
The Dragones began to wander about the barrio visibly armed partly in order to intimidate 
the barrio population, but also the Killers, who spontaneously disaggregated over the course 
of the next month in the face of this terrorization. 
At the same time, it is important to note that a generalised acceleration in leaving the pandilla 
had been occurring. This affected both the Killers and the Dragones, and continued to affect 
the latter after the former had disbanded. The Dragones rapidly reduced in size from some 
forty integrants just after the conflict with the Killers to just twenty members by the 
beginning of 2000.60 To a certain extent, demographic factors came into play, as the peak of 
pandillero recruitment in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández seems to have been reached in 1995, 
and many of those who joined the pandilla then were 14-15 years old, and consequently 
                                                 
60  2 of the 20 subsequently died due to drug-related health complications. 
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reaching an age at which “maturing out” naturally came into play. At the same time, the 
conflict with the Killers and its aftermath also profoundly affected some Dragones gang 
member, as one called Elvis, who had had to flee the barrio in order to avoid being caught by 
the Police after the Dragones-Killers conflict, makes clear: 
It was horrible, I was running from here to there, millions of places, from one to 
the other to avoid being caught, and it’s horrible, I tell you… You feel like you’re 
being tracked, hunted, like an animal, always looking over your shoulder… I 
never want to be on the run again, so ever since all that, I’ve looked to distance 
myself, to avoid problems, especially as those guys in the pandilla have got 
crazier and crazier, you know, more violent and all… I began spending less time 
with the pandilla, doing my own thing, not looking for trouble. I still talk with 
everybody and all, but when there’s going to be trouble, I do my own thing, you 
know, to avoid problems…61  
 
Another ex-Dragones pandillero called Ronnie told me that he had become “independent” 
because he did not like the new look gang’s antagonism with the wider neighbourhood 
community.  
 Taken together, these events arguably prepared the ground for the gang to become 
closely related to the drugs trade. A drug economy cannot rely on classic mechanisms of 
regulation and contract-enforcement – such as the law – in a context where drugs are 
considered illicit goods. It needs alternative mechanisms to impose regularity onto 
transactions. As numerous social theorists have pointed out, perhaps the most basic form of 
social regulation is achieved through the use and threat of violence (indeed, this is what 
ultimately lies behind the power of the law, albeit in a somewhat veiled manner).62 The gang, 
as the dominant organisation commanding the instruments of violence in the neighbourhood, 
was ideally positioned to provide such regulation, and as an ex-gang member himself, the 
barrio narco was ideally connected to the gang to involve them in the drugs trade.  
At the same time, however, the exclusive nature of the drugs trade and the relatively low 
profit levels of the drugs trade in Nicaragua – certainly compared to the USA, Mexico, or 
Colombia, for example – meant that in order to be able to provide the necessary violence in 
an effective way, the gang had to be a small, compact, self- interested unit rather than a large 
group of a hundred individuals imbued with what Mancur Olson has called an “encompassing 
interest” for the wider neighbourhood.63 Had cocaine appeared in the barrio in 1996-97, for 
                                                 
61  A further factor to take into account is that in late 1999 and early 2000, the municipal authorities built two 
basketball courts in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, incidentally providing an alternative focal point to the 
pandilla  for neighbourhood youth, and in particular for those wavering over membership. It should be noted, 
however, that this did not signal an increased presence of the municipal authorities in the barrio, as the 
basketball courts constitute the only public works to have been carried out in the neighbourhood since the 
Sandinista  government’s urban reconstruction efforts in the early 1980s. 
62  See for example M. Foucault, Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison , translated by A. Sheridan, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977; T. Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by R. Tuck, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996 [1651]; K. Marx, Selected Writings, edited by D. McLellan, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977, pp.159-192 & 221-247; G. Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, translated by K. H. 
Wolff and R. Bendix, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1955; and M. Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 
translated, edited, and with an introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, London: Routledge, 1948, and 
Economy and Society, edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich, 2 volumes, Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1978, especially volume 2. 
63  See M. Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982. At the same time, it is clear that they also reinforced each other. For 
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example, the social nature of pandillerismo as a given type of institutional arrangement might 
have precluded the pandilla as an organisational form from becoming a key element of the 
drugs trade. When it appeared in 1999-2000, however, pandillerismo as an institutional 
arrangement was undergoing a mutation that was leading to an organisational shakedown of 
the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang, to ultimately just twenty members imbued with a very 
different sense of their relationship with the wider neighbourhood community. One could 
therefore say that there existed a “coincidental compatibility” between the two social 
phenomena, which was the result of the particular moment in time the drugs trade emerged in 
Nicaragua, the changing nature of pandillerismo as an institutional arrangement, the 
particular organisational nature of the gang, as well as specific individual agencies. At the 
same time, however, underlying this whole process was a critical question of power. 
 
Institutional arrangements, power, and social change 
Whatever their form or function, and however they emerge, institutional arrangements are 
multidimensional fields of power. They are both a means and a source of power, constituted 
through the control of economic resources, authoritative positions, means of violence, and the 
opportunities they create. In many ways, the institutional arrangements of a society can be 
said to be the outcome of strategic distributive conflicts between different social groups, in 
which groups with disproportionate resources and power try to constrain the actions of others. 
This is a point that is well made by Charles Tilly in his famous essay on “War Making and 
State Making as Organized Crime”, in which he traces the rise of modern European states to 
an initial process of anarchic conflict between barbarian warlords:  
In an idealized sequence, a great lord made war so effectively as to become 
dominant in a substantial territory, but that war making led to increased extraction 
of the means of war – men, arms, food, lodging, transportation, supplies, and/or 
the money to buy them – from the population within that territory. The building 
up of war-making capacity likewise increased the capacity to extract. The very 
activity of extraction, if successful, entailed the elimination, neutralization, or 
cooptation of the great lord’s local rivals; thus, it led to state making. As a by-
product, it created organization in the form of tax-collection agencies, police 
forces, courts, exchequers, account keepers; thus it again led to state making. 
…As a result of these multiple strategic choices, a distinctive state apparatus 
grew up within each major section of Europe.64  
 
This shift in the focus of attention from the efficiency aspects of the different elements 
making up a particular institutional arrangement or the specific conjunction of events that 
leads to its emergence at a particular point in time to the question of power inevitably 
confronts us with the question of somehow grappling with political processes (and here, I 
                                                                                                                                                        
example, the increased consumption of crack cocaine by gang members and their involvement in drug dealing 
certainly contributed to accelerating the dropping out of younger members from the gang. By their very nature, 
both are activities that are less suited for the young, as smoking crack has excessively strong and highly 
dangerous effects on the young, and dealing would be problematic for reasons linked to client confidence. 
64  C. Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in C. Besteman (ed.), Violence: A Reader, 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002 [1985], pp.51-52. Mancur Olson (1993) makes a similar point, based on 
the case of early 20th century warlords in China, emphasising the logic for “roving bandits” to become 
“stationary bandits” and how the latter eventually develop an “encompassing interest” for their domains, which 
leads to stable formal political systems (‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’, American Political 
Science Review, 87:3 (1993), pp.567-576). 
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deliberately use the term “political” with a small rather than a big “p”, taking it at its most 
basic, as it relates to the actual constitution of ontological order). This is something that 
Tilly’s analysis perhaps overlooks, assuming that a warlord seizes power without considering 
how the power necessary for this is first appropriated and then maintained, and in what form, 
something that is perhaps particularly crucial to consider when thinking about social forms 
intimately associated with violence (as a source and instrument of power). In other words, it 
is critical to consider what the sociological basis of power might be, as well as the specific 
processes through which it is legitimised, for herein lies the key to understanding what might 
be different and what might be similar between the two manifestations of Nicaraguan 
pandillerismo presented above.  
At its most basic, power can be said to relate to social organisation. As Anthony Giddens has 
underlined, human beings are organisational creatures, craving “ontological security”.65 As 
fields of power, institutional arrangements objectify roles and relations, achieving a degree of 
stability and continuity without which social life cannot exist, and it is this, more than 
anything else, that is the sociological measure of power. From this perspective, pandillerismo 
arguably constitutes a particular form of power, for both in 1996-97 and in 2002, the gang 
and its violence organised neighbourhood society in fundamental ways. They did so very 
differently, however, the first in a horizontally collective manner, while the second was 
arguably more vertical and exclusive in nature. But both nevertheless constituted at their 
respective points in time the key element of a particular institutional arrangement that 
fostered an enduring structure of governance and rule in the neighbourhood. As such, in both 
1996-97 and 2002, pandillerismo can plausibly be seen to constitute a form of what Robert 
Latham calls “social sovereignty”. 66 Sovereignty can be defined as a condition whereby a 
specific kind of institutional arrangement possesses final and absolute political authority – in 
other words, power – in a given community. Taking as his starting point the idea that 
“sovereignty can be and historically has been understood as an attribute not just of states but 
of other forms of social organization as well, operating within and across national 
boundaries”, Latham elaborates the concept of “social sovereignty” to describe non-state 
“bodies of relations that effectively structure practices and agency in a given area of life”,67 
of which pandillerismo in Nicaragua arguably constitutes a clear example. 
Recognizing non-state forms of sovereignty does not necessarily mean pushing the state to 
the margins of political imagination, however. Rather, Latham’s aim is to “force upon us the 
question of who or what constructs and maintains the structures of codes and practices that 
set the terms for collective life” in order to challenge what he perceives to be the excessive 
and rather exclusive focus on the state in relation to the organisation of collective social 
purpose.68 Within a wider context where the Nicaraguan state is arguably a “lame leviathan” 
no longer capable of effectively imposing universal order within its boundaries, and 
pandillerismo constitutes an autonomous form of organising localised collective social life, 
conceptualising them as forms of “social sovereignty” makes sense.69 The question, however, 
is how viable this form of sovereignty can be. Power alone cannot guarantee stability and 
continuity because it is an erratic process, and generally relies on auxiliary processes of 
legitimisation. This is especially the case in relation to violence as an instrument of power. 
As Max Weber famously pointed out, the state’s monopoly over violence is in fact a 
                                                 
65  See A. Giddens, Modernity and Self Identity, Oxford: Polity, 1991. 
66  See R. Latham, ‘Social Sovereignty’, Theory, Culture & Society, 17:4 (2000), pp.1-18. 
67  Latham (2000), pp.2-3. 
68  Latham (2000), p.15. 
69  See Callaghy (1987) and Zartmann (1995) on the notion of the “lame leviathan”.  
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monopoly over legitimate violence rather than violence per se,70 and although the barrio Luis 
Fanor Hernández gang held a (near) monopoly over violence in the neighbourhood in both 
1996-97 and 2002, the violence embedded at the heart of the two manifestations of 
pandillerismo in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández in both the earlier and later periods was 
perceived very differently and had different sources of legitimacy.  
If we adopt as measure of legitimacy the probability that those affected by the exercise of 
power will conform to the authority exercising that power, in 1996-97, the gang derived its 
legitimacy from the perception that its interests coincided with those of the neighbourhood 
population. In 2002, however, the gang’s legitimacy was derived from the regime of terror it 
had imposed on the neighbourhood, and as Barrington Moore has suggested,71 terror is a poor 
source of legitimacy. While it can work, the regime it produces is inevitably fragile. This is 
arguably particularly the case when terror is used to legitimise a collective order aimed at the 
accumulation of assets by a small group in society. This can lead to increasing temptation for 
others to engage in predatory activities, which in turn lead to an increased importance of 
deterrence, and for deterrence to work, the threat of retaliation must be credible. As Robert 
Bates has described very well, in the final analysis this: 
increases the likelihood of violence. In such societies, private warriors populate 
public places; people bearing arms and intimating their willingness to employ 
them strut in the boulevards and cluster in the marketplace. Public places are 
populated with provocateurs; where families are honor-bound to protect their 
own, hot-tempered youths find protection against the consequences of brazen 
behavior. Interactions thus take place in a volatile ambience of honor and 
impudence; young hotheads move to the fore; and a culture of machismo 
permeates the society. The private provision of security thus creates a hair-trigger 
society. Provocative acts become commonplace – but also uncommonly 
dangerous because they can unleash violent reprisals.72 
 
From this perspective, then, the question to ask, is after having swung from gang-based 
collective social violence to drug-based individual economic entrepreneurship, where this 
process of social change will lead Nicaragua next. 
 
Post Scriptum 
I returned to barrio Luis Fanor Hernández again in December 2002-January 2003, and found 
the situation to have changed significantly once again. In particular, the gang as an organised 
collective form had effectively disappeared. This seemed to be due to at least three factors. 
Firstly, gang members had continued increasing their levels of crack consumption, which had 
two effects. On the one hand, it made effective drug dealing more difficult, as conducting 
transactions when high is not practical. On the other hand, it also meant that pandilleros 
needed to increase their revenues in order to buy greater quantities of drugs. This led them to 
adopt more efficient selling practices, and they would no longer hang around on street 
corners as a group, selling in turns, but now did so individually, aggressively trying to get as 
many clients as possible. One might say here that the gang fell prey to mercantile logic. 
                                                 
70  See Weber (1948), p.78. 
71  B. Moore, Jr., ‘The Impact and Function of Terror’, in C. Besteman (ed.), Violence: A Reader, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002 [1954]. 
72  R. H. Bates, Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development, New York: W. W. Norton, 
2001, p.46. 
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Secondly, there was a notable increased and more effective police presence in the 
neighbourhood compared to February-March 2002, or indeed 1996-97. The Bolaños 
government that came to power in January 2002 has recruited a large number of new 
policemen and provided the National Police with the financial means to be a much more 
intimidating presence. Not only were Police patrols now stopping on their rounds of the 
barrio – some patrols even occurring on foot – but between March and December 2002 there 
were also several raids on drug dealers in the barrio. This last factor significantly changed the 
dynamics of the local drug economy, which became more clandestine. Muleros disappeared 
as a group, as selling openly in the streets made them vulnerable to arrest. Púsheres now 
frequently changed the houses out of which they operated, and the narco had in fact moved to 
another neighbourhood altogether, although he still maintained several houses in barrio Luis 
Fanor Hernández and it continued to be his principal site of operation. Drugged up 
individuals – many of them ex-pandilleros – now hung about in the streets in order to direct 
clients to a púsher’s house in exchange for a paquete, but this seemed to happen in an 
uncoordinated way. To a certain extent, this new evolution can be interpreted as reflecting a 
change in the relative power of the gangs versus the Nicaraguan state, with state-based forms 
of sovereignty perhaps regaining some ground over more social forms of sovereignty. 
Whether this is a temporary condition or something more permanent remains to be seen, 
however, particularly considering that somewhat ominously the narco was said to be in 
contact with Colombian drug cartels, trying to establish an exclusive partnership which 
would see them deliver drugs directly to him in Managua. Were this to come about, it would 
undoubtedly introduce another violent actor in the Nicaraguan context, and one that has 
already proven in Colombia that it has no hesitations in taking on other social actors in order 
to try and establish itself as the principal locus of power and domination in society. 
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countries, have broken down even to the point of violent conflict while others have not. Our work 
asks whether processes of globalisation have precipitated or helped to avoid crisis and social 
breakdown. 
Research Objectives 
 
 We will assess how constellations of power at local, national and global levels drive 
processes of institutional change, collapse and reconstruction and in doing so will challenge 
simplistic paradigms about the beneficial effects of economic and political liberalisation. 
 
 We will examine the effects of international interventions promoting democratic reform, 
human rights and market competition on the ‘conflict management capacity’ and production and 
distributional systems of existing polities.  
 
 We will analyse how communities have responded to crisis, and the incentives and moral 
frameworks that have led either toward violent or non-violent outcomes.  
 
 We will examine what kinds of formal and informal institutional arrangements poor 
communities have constructed to deal with economic survival and local order. 
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